In an auction with externalities, a buyer's type is multidimensional and specifies the payoff he would get for each of the N+1 possible outcomes: the seller keeps the object or buyer i (i=1, ..., N) gets the object. We provide a characterization of multidimensional incentive compatible mechanisms similar to that for one-dimensional mechanisms. Although reservation utilities are endogenous and type-dependent, the participation constraint is binding for only one``critical'' type. A main difficulty in a multidimensional setting is the``integrability'' condition. We present a geometric characterization for discontinuous conservative vector fields. In auctions where the buyers submit scalar bids and the seller transfers the object to one of the buyers for sure, a second-price auction maximizes revenue. With two buyers, this auction remains optimal even if the seller can set a reservation price.
INTRODUCTION
Mechanism design problems appear naturally in numerous economic situations, including the regulation of a monopolist, auctions, government procurement, nonlinear pricing, and the provision of public goods. By and large, most of the vast literature on mechanism design has been restricted to the case in which uncertainty is modelled by a single parameter, and the commodity space has dimension two (for example, the quantity-money commodity space in nonlinear pricing). In many problems, however, a satisfying analysis requires a multidimensional treatment.
A fundamental assumption in the literature on optimal auction design is that agents' final payoffs are determined solely by whether or not they obtain the auctioned good, and by the payments made as required by the rules of the auction (see, for example, Myerson [13] , and Milgrom and Weber [11] ). The possibility that the auctioned good might play a role in future interactions among the auction's participants is excluded. But, there are many situations in which an auction's participants interact after the close of the auction, and where the outcome of the auction affects the nature of their future interaction. Then, when a buyer does not obtain the object, he is no longer indifferent about the identity of the winner of the auction. Several illustrations are: changes of ownership (such as mergers or privatizations) in oligopolistic markets; the sale of a patent when there is downstream competition between buyers; the award of major projects that lead to the creation of a new technology standard; the location of environmentally hazardous enterprises such as waste management plants or nuclear reactors; the location of a potentially powerful international organization such as the European Central Bank.
The previous discussion suggests a model that differs from most of the literature on optimal auction design, and more broadly, mechanism design problems in two important respects:
(1) Buyer i 's preferences are determined by an N-dimensional vector t i =(t i 1 , ..., t i N ). The coordinate t i i can be thought of as the usual``private value'' of player i, while each other coordinate t i j can be interpreted as his total payoff (excluding payments made in the auction) should buyer j get the object. We use the descriptive term``externalities'' to refer to these interaction terms. We are then confronted with a multidimensional mechanism design problem.
(2) Since buyers will generally be unable to escape the effect of externalities simply by refusing to participate in the auction, the agents'`r eservation utilities'' are neither exogenously given, nor type-independent. Consider the event where a buyer refuses to participate in the auction. In contrast to auctions without externalities, where buyers' outside options can be normalized to zero, when externalities are present, a buyer's reservation value will, in effect, vary with both his type and the seller's action.
In this framework, we first characterize incentive compatible and individually rational auction mechanisms. We then turn to the problem of finding optimal mechanisms that maximize the seller's expected utility (revenue plus externality), in the restricted class of standard auctions (defined below).
There are several papers concerning multidimensional mechanism design. Two strands of this literature are fairly well developed, the first studying nonlinear pricing in multiproduct monopoly, and the second addressing the regulation of multiproduct monopolists. Among the contributions to the former strand are: Champsaur and Rochet [2] , Laffont, Maskin and Rochet [5] , McAfee, McMillan and Whinston [10] , Mirman and Sibley [12] , Palfrey [14] , Spence [19] , and Wilson [20, 21] . Notable contributions to the second strand include: Laffont and Tirole [6] , and Lewis and Sappington [7] . In addition, there are a few papers we would like to mention because they concentrate on the development of general tools and methods, and because they illustrate the additional difficulties that are present in multidimensional models. They are: Matthews and Moore [8] , McAfee and McMillan [9] , Rochet [15] , Rochet and Chone [16] , and Armstrong [1] . We discuss the last three because they are relevant for our own work.
Rochet [15] introduces a conjugate duality approach, and presents a very useful characterization result for incentive compatible mechanisms. The analysis is restricted to utility functions that are linear in their characteristic space. For a multiproduct monopolist model, Rochet and Chone [16] show that in an optimal mechanism, the participation constraint is active for a set of types (possibly of positive measure).
Armstrong [1] studies the optimal tariff for a multi-product monopolist selling to a measure of non-interacting consumers. He is able to reduce substantially the complexity of the underlying optimization problem, and obtains solutions in closed form for classes of problems in which the agents' utilities and the distribution of their characteristics are related in a specific way. In addition, given some mild technical conditions, Armstrong shows that it is always in the interest of the monopolist to exclude a positive measure of buyers from consumption.
In Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti [3] we look at a complementary framework where buyers have private information on the externalities they cause to others. Moreover, we assume there that these externalities do not depend on the sufferer's identity. The seller's problem in this framework is much simpler, and eventually reduces to a one-dimensional mechanism design problem for which a full solution is obtained.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the model and invoke the revelation principle to formulate the design problem in terms of two functions on the space of type profiles: the probability assignment function, specifying the random allocation of the object amongst the players, and the payment function stipulating the transfer from each buyer to the seller.
In Section 3 we use conjugate duality to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a mechanism to be incentive compatible, similar to the envelope condition for one-dimensional mechanism design problems. This characterization result allows us to eliminate half the variables (the payment functions) in the problem. In particular, we show that incentive compatible mechanisms produce interim utility functions for each agent which are convex potentials. The gradient of an agent's interim utility is the conditional probability vector given his type, where each coordinate is the probability that the object be assigned to the corresponding buyer. Since i 's interim utility is a potential, the conditional probability assignment vector must be a conservative function of his type. We informally call these requirements the``integrability constraints''. Section 4 deals with the participation constraints. Here, these constraints involve additional difficulties, not present in an auction without externalities. In one dimensional mechanism design problems, the participation constraints bind only for the``lowest type''. But, as the example in Rochet and Chone [16] suggests, this need not be the case in multidimensional problems. Moreover, in our environment, the buyers' reservation values are endogenous, and participation constraints are type-dependent. Thus, we must also construct optimal``threats'' that ensure the participation of the buyers. Despite the relatively complex structure, we are able to show that it is enough to check the participation constraint for a``critical'' type of every player.
In the rest of the paper we restrict attention to symmetric settings and to a class of anonymous mechanisms, which we call standard bidding procedures, for which we are able to deal with the integrability constraints. In a standard bidding procedure, agents can only submit one-dimensional``bids''. Thus, buyers are not able to fully convey their types to the seller.
In Section 5 we confine attention to mechanisms that always transfer the object. In this case, we show that the optimal standard bidding procedure consists of a second-price auction. In the equilibrium of the second-price auction an agent makes a bid equal to the difference between his valuation for the object (net of externalities) and the expected externality suffered in case another agent gets the good.
In Section 6 we study second-price auctions with reserve prices (so the seller may keep the object sometimes). The integrability constraint plays a complex role when we try to determine the set of types that bid below the reserve price (and hence never get the good). This constraint translates into a geometric condition about the direction of the normal to the boundary of the set of types M 0 that bid below the reserve price. The geometric condition can be stated as a differential equation, whose solution allows us to obtain the boundary of M 0 , and explicitly construct the equilibrium strategies and the associated seller's revenue.
An interesting question is whether the seller will, independently of the relation between his characteristics and the buyers' characteristics, prefer to impose a strictly positive reserve price (i.e., will always exclude some types from consumption). The fact that exclusion is always optimal is a main finding in Armstrong's work. Contrary to Armstrong, we show by example that non-exclusion (i.e., imposing a reserve price equal to zero) is optimal for a range of the model's parameters.
THE MODEL
There are N buyers, indexed by i=1, ..., N, and a seller, designated as player i=0. We will refer to the``players'' when we want to include the seller, and to the``buyers'' when we want to exclude her, although the seller is not a player of the auction game. Let I :=[1, ..., N] be the set of buyers. The seller owns a single unit of an indivisible object.
Buyer i 's preferences are determined by his vector type t i =(t i 1 , ..., t i N ) where t i j is buyer i 's payoff when player j gets the object. 1 A common situation, which we call the negative externalities case, is when each buyer receives a positive payoff if he obtains the object, and a negative payoff if anybody else gets it. But, in general, we will also allow for the possibility of positive externalities.
The seller has an analogous type represented by the N-dimensional vector t 0 , which is common knowledge amongst the buyers (ex-ante). Buyer i 's type is drawn from
N&i , according with the density f i , and is independent of all other players' types. Thus, the probability that the buyers' types are given by the N-tuple
. Buyers' types are private information. The negative externalities case corresponds to e 1 0 and v 0 0. We allow for the possibility that e 0 =& andÂor ``upper-left corner'') of T i is C i :=(e 1 , ..., e 1 , v 0 , e 1 , ..., e 1 ); we also say that t i =C i is player i 's``lowest type''. Implicitly, we have made above a symmetry assumption that later plays an important role in the analysis: the extreme externalities e 0 and e 1 for a player i are independent of which other player gets the object. We have also assumed that appropriately permuting the coordinates, the origin C i is thè`s ame'' for each player i; this, however, is irrelevant and assumed only for convenience.
Buyer i 's utility is additively separable: if he pays x i to the seller and player j gets the object, his utility is t i j &x i , where we define t i 0 :=0. In general, a buyer's payment need not be zero even if he doesn't get the object. The seller's utility is also additively separable: if buyer i pays her x i , i # I, and she gives the object to player j ( j could be 0), her utility is t 0 j +x 1 + } } } +x N (again, we define t 0 0 :=0). For the study of general properties of auction mechanisms, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to direct revelation mechanisms for which it is a Bayesian equilibrium for each buyer to report his type truthfully. Since a buyer cannot be forced to``participate'' in the auction,`n onparticipation'' must be included among his possible reports.
be the set of probability vectors. The coordinate _ i of a probability vector _ represents the probability that player i gets the object, and _ 0 :=1& i # I _ i represents the probability that the seller keeps the object. The seller specifies the rules of the auction in terms of a revelation mechanism (\, x, p), where \=(\ 1 , ..., \ N ) # 7 N is a profile of N probability vectors, x i : T Ä R, i # I, and p: T Ä 7. The seller asks each of the buyers simultaneously to report a type. If all buyers submit a type and the report profile is (t 1 , ..., t N ) # T, buyer i must pay the seller x i (t 1 , ..., t N ), and he gets the object with probability p i (t 1 , ..., t N ). If buyer i refuses to participate in the auction while all other buyers submit a report, the object is given to player j with probability \ i j , j # I, and no buyer makes a payment to the seller.
2 If two or more buyers refuse to submit a report, then, say, the seller keeps the object with probability 1 and nobody makes any payments.
3
Suppose player i believes everybody else reports truthfully. Then, to assess the expected value of his reports, he only needs to know the conditional expected value, given his own type, of his payment and the probability 263 AUCTIONS WITH EXTERNALITIES 2 The probability vector \ i is designed to``punish'' buyer i when he refuses to report his type. We assume that buyer i cannot be forced to accept the object, hence \ i i is always 0. 3 We study the Nash equilibria of the game, and disregard the possibility of coalition formation. Hence, profitable multiple deviations are irrelevant. If the domain of the function p were extended to include profiles where some players report``nonparticipation'', then the vectors \ i could be included as part of the definition of p. We have chosen the domain T mainly to simplify the notation below; in an honest equilibrium, no player reports``nonparticipation''. assignment vector. Define then the functions y i : T i Ä R and q i : T i Ä 7 as follows:
We will refer to these functions as buyer i 's conditional expected payment and conditional expected probability assignment in the mechanism ( \, x, p). If buyer i believes his opponents will report truthfully, and reports type s i when his type is t i , his expected utility is
The auction mechanism (\, x, p) is said to be incentive compatible for buyer i if
and to satisfy the participation constraint for buyer i if
The right hand side of the last inequality is buyer i 's expected value when he doesn't make any payments to the seller, and the seller assigns the object randomly according with the probability vector \ i . The auction mechanism is feasible if it is incentive compatible and satisfies the participation constraints for every buyer.
Clearly, buyer i cares only about his expected payment, and if ( \, x, p) is a feasible mechanism, so is ( \, xÄ , p), where xÄ i (t) :=y i (t i ) for all t # T. Moreover, the seller expects the same revenue with xÄ or with x. Thus, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to mechanisms for which the payment of each buyer depends only on his own report. Consequently, we will specify below auction mechanisms directly in terms of ( \, y, p). However, for comparing the mechanism with traditional auctions, it is sometimes more convenient to describe explicitly how buyer i's payment changes with his opponents' bids (i.e., in a second-price auction).
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
Any auction mechanism ( \, y, p) presents each buyer i with a``menu''
This optimization problem determines buyers i 's optimal report when he is presented with the menu M i and his type is t i . Various properties of S i are readily available and have been previously recorded by Armstrong [1] and Rochet [15] (for a general reference on conjugate duality and properties of convex functions, the reader should consult the classic references by Rockafellar [17, 18] ). S i is convex, continuous, and monotonically increasing. Let S i (t i ) denote the sub differential of S i at t i . Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) (\, y, p) is incentive compatible for buyer i;
Moreover, since S i is convex, S i is differentiable almost everywhere (a.e.), and if
Note that S i (t i ) is non decreasing in each of its arguments because q i (t i ), being a probability vector, is always nonnegative. The standard extension for vector-valued functions of the familiar notion of monotonicity for realvalued functions is given in the next definition. A function is convex only if its sub differential is a monotone map (Rockafellar [17] ). Thus, if ( \, y, p) is incentive compatible, q i must be monotone for each i.
The integral in the right hand side is a line integral, which does not depend on the specific path from s i to t i . 4 That is, the vector field q i must be conservative. 5 The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 1. Consider the auction mechanism ( \, y, p), and let q i , i # I, be the corresponding conditional probability assignment functions. Then,
(1) The mechanism is incentive compatible for buyer i iff the vector field q i : T i Ä 7 is monotone and conservative, and for each t i # T i ,
, where
(2) the mechanism satisfies the participation constraints for buyer i iff
By part (1), the payment and surplus of the lowest type, y i (C i ) and
. Therefore, part (1) of Proposition 1 states that for incentive compatible mechanisms, the expected payment function y i is uniquely determined by y i (C i ) and the probability assignment function p. We will denote the vector (
We next present a technical result, which provides a geometric characterization of the integrability condition for a class of piecewise continuous conditional expected probability assignment functions. Many traditional auctions, adapted to the current model with externalities, yield conditional expected probability assignment functions that fall within this class. More generally, this is often the case for deterministic mechanisms (where the rules of the auction specify that a.e. the object is assigned to a specific player with probability 1). Although we state the result for probability assignment functions, the proposition should prove useful in other contexts 266 JEHIEL, MOLDOVANU, AND STACCHETTI 4 If S i is continuously differentiable in T i , the above identity is a consequence of the fundamental theorem of calculus. The identity is also valid when S i is a convex function, even if S i is not differentiable everywhere. This has been shown by Krishna and Maenner [4] . Our Proposition 2 below develops the appropriate test for checking whether q i is conservative, when q i is discontinuous (i.e., when S i is not differentiable) in a finite collection of manifolds.
That is, iff the Jacobian of v is symmetric.
as well (i.e., nonlinear pricing). We use it in Section 6 to find the equilibrium of second-price auctions with reserve prices. The proof of Proposition 2 is relegated to the Appendix.
is continuous for each j=1, ..., k. Suppose each M j is an N-dimensional manifold with a piecewise smooth boundary 6 Then, q i is conservative iff (1) q i restrict to M j is conservative for each j=1, ..., k; and (2) whenever M j and M m are two adjacent regions, the jump in q i (t i ) as t i crosses from M j to M m is perpendicular to the common boundary between M j and M m . That is, if t i is in the common boundary between M j and M m , and n is the unitary normal vector of the boundary between M j and M m at t i , then the vector
is parallel to n.
THE PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS
In this section we show that it is enough to verify the participation constraint for the critical type O i , where O i is the type in T i closest to the point (0, ..., 0, v 0 , 0, ..., 0). If type O i satisfies the participation constraint and the auction mechanism is incentive compatible, then all the other participation constraints are satisfied (and thus, they are redundant). Moreover, although it is possible to choose different critical types, from the seller's point of view, the choice of O i above is optimal. Let p: T Ä 7 be the probability assignment vector of an arbitrary incentive compatible mechanism. That is, q i : T i Ä 7 is monotone and conservative for each i # I. We want to find y: T Ä R N and \ # 7 N such that (\, y, p) is feasible and maximizes the seller's expected revenue (for the given p).
By Proposition 1, y is completely determined by y(C) and p (through the incentive compatibility constraints). For each i # I, let
Geometrically, we are choosing the slope ( \ i ) of a hyperplane through the origin of R N and a downward vertical translation ( y i (C i )) for the graph of S i so that the translation is maximized subject to the constraint that the graph of S i stay (weakly) above the hyperplane. Obviously, since S i is convex, an optimal (\ i , y i (C i )) will make the hyperplane tangent to the graph of S i at some critical point O i , and therefore
. We distinguish three cases (i) the negative externalities case when e 1 <0, (ii) the positive externalities case when e 0 >0, and (iii) the mixed case when e 0 0 e 1 . If e 1 <0, all the externalities are negative, and the most severe threat the seller can make is to give the object to one of i 's opponents for sure if i does not participate. That is, she should pick
, the graph of S i will be above the hyperplane everywhere else. That is, the critical type is O i =C i . If e 0 >0, then all the externalities are positive and the seller should commit to keeping the object when buyer i does not participate. That is, she should choose \ i =0 (a horizontal hyperplane). Since q i (t i ) 0 for all t i , the function S i is increasing and the critical type is the point O i =(e 0 , ..., e 0 , v 0 , e 0 , ..., e 0 ), where S i attains its minimum. In this case,
Finally, when e 0 0 e 1 , the externalities are mixed. Here the critical type is O i =(0, ..., 0, v 0 , 0, ..., 0). To see this, recall that \ i i =0 and therefore the hyperplane must contain the point (O i , 0). Since the graph of S i must remain above the hyperplane, we must have
is on the boundary of T i , and hence S i (O i ) is not a singleton. The above optimal translations y i (C i ) are
in case (ii) and (iii), and the corresponding optimal threat vectors are case (i): any vector in \^i # 7 such that \^i i =0, \^i j q i j (C i ) for all j{i, and j # I \^i j =1; case (ii): \^i=0;
The following proposition summarizes our discussion. Its proof in the Appendix verifies that \^i is the appropriate slope for the hyperplane in each of the three cases.
Proposition 3. Let p be such that every q i , i # I, is monotone and conservative. Then ( \^, y^(C), p) is the optimal auction mechanism among all auction mechanisms with probability assignment function p. In particular, if (\, y(C), p) is a feasible mechanism (not necessarily optimal ), then y(C) y^(C) and (\^, y(C), p) is also feasible.
Proposition 3 shows that as in Myerson's auction model, it is enough to check the participation constraint for only one critical type. Here, buyer i 's critical type is O i , which the closest type to (0, ..., v 0 , ..., 0).
STANDARD BIDDING MECHANISMS FOR THE SYMMETRIC CASE
We now study more traditional auctions in which each buyer i submits a one-dimensional bid b i . For symmetric settings, we derive the equilibrium of the second-price auction with an entry fee. We then show that this auction maximizes the seller's expected revenue among all standard auctions (with one-dimensional bids) where the seller never keeps the good. In particular, in this framework we can deal with the complex integrability constraints (that each q i be conservative). Finally we note that the secondprice auction with entry fee is optimal in the class of all auctions that always transfer the good if there are only two buyers, or if there are n buyers, but for all j{i{k, t i j =t i k . We will now assume that the set of types for each buyer is bounded.
N&i , where v 0 >0, v 1 , e 0 and e 1 are all finite real numbers.
In a standard bidding mechanism, the rules of the auction are specified by the probability assignment function p:
, where x i (b i , ..., b N ) and p i (b 1 , ..., b N ) are, respectively, player i's payment and probability of winning the object given the bid profile b=(b 1 , ..., b N ), and \ i is the lottery used to assign the object if buyer i does not participate. The latter is chosen according with Proposition 3, and is not mentioned again in the analysis below. The interval [b Ä , b ] represents the set of admissible bids; an inadmissible bid is equivalent to nonparticipation.
In this section, all mechanisms are assumed to be standard, unless otherwise specified.
Situations in which the buyers are ex-ante identical are relatively natural. A typical requirement in the model without externalities is that the buyers' types are all drawn from the same distribution. Here we require more. In particular, if i, j, k are three different buyers, and { 1 and { 2 are two possible externalities, we assume that it is equally likely that (t
Definition. The setting is symmetric if
(S 3 ) for any i{ j and type
Condition (S 1 ) says that no matter which buyer gets the object, the seller suffers the same externality. (S 2 ) states that the probabilities that buyer i is of type t i or another type equal to t i but with coordinates j and k (where j{i and k{i) switched, are the same. Finally, (S 3 ) says that types for each player are drawn from the``same'' distribution. For the rest of this section, we assume that the setting is always symmetric.
We restrict attention to anonymous mechanisms in which the seller cannot make the outcome depend on the identity of the buyers, 7 and to symmetric equilibria, where all buyers use the same bidding strategy. In B=(B 1 , ..., B N ) 
8
Given a standard bidding mechanism ( p, x) and a bidding strategy profile  B=(B 1 , ..., B N 
It is easy to see that if ( p, x) is an anonymous mechanism and B is a symmetric bidding strategy, then y i #y 1 for all i>1. That is, the expected payment function is the same for all buyers. The next lemma also establishes that the conditional probability assignment function is the same for all the buyers up to a permutation of coordinates. Moreover, for any buyer i and any bid b i , each of i 's opponents has the same conditional probability of getting the object. The proof of the lemma is relegated to the Appendix. 
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8 It may also seem natural to require in the definition of a symmetric bidding strategy that B 1 (6 ij (t 1 ))=B 1 (t 1 ) for all t 1 # T 1 and i{1{ j. However, this condition is not needed for our results.
:
where the second equality follows from Lemma 1.
N (that is, the probability that the seller keep the object is 0).
If B is a symmetric bidding strategy for a mechanism ( p, x) that always transfers the object, then
This decomposition shows that given a symmetric bidding strategy, buyer i's expected payoff is determined completely by his bid and the difference between his valuation of the object and the average externality he suffers in case another buyer gets the object. Accordingly, we make the following definition. 
Lemma 2. Let ( p, x) be an anonymous mechanism that always transfers the object. Suppose the symmetric bidding strategy B is an equilibrium for ( p, y). Then, for all i # I and a.e.
Proof. By symmetry, it is enough to show the result for i=1. Player 1's surplus function is given by
be the menu set. 10 The surplus function is convex, and b 1 * maximizes player 1's expected utility ) (which is also optimal at s 1 ). Redefine B i , i 2, accordingly to maintain symmetry. This will not affect any of the players' expectations, and the new B will remain a symmetric equilibrium.
10 By symmetry, every player i faces the same menu M, and therefore q
, and A symmetric revelation principle. By Lemma 2, for any anonymous mechanism ( p, x) that always transfers the object and corresponding symmetric equilibrium B in which all types of every player participate, there exists another anonymous mechanism ( p~, x~) for which B* is an equilibrium, and such that for each i and t i # T i ,
Here q i i (t i ) and q~i i (t i ) ( y i and y~i) are respectively the conditional probabilities of winning the object (payments) in the equilibria B and B*. Indeed, for any b # [b Ä *, b *] N , choose any t # T such that b=(B 1 *(t 1 ), ..., B* N (t N )), and let
That is, without loss of generality, for symmetric equilibria of anonymous mechanisms that always transfer the object, we can restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms in which each player i reveals his``summary type'' B i * (t i ). We can also view any anonymous mechanism ( p, x) for which B* is an equilibrium as a direct revelation mechanism ( p^, x^) for which truthtelling (and participation) is an equilibrium. We can define ( p^, x^) as follows:
) and
For each i and t i # T i , consider the following change of variables: The determinant of the Jacobian of this change of variables is 1, and its inverse is 
represents the density of all types that have the same summary type s i i (and G i is its corresponding distribution), and # i (s i i ) is the analogue of Myerson's virtual type. The symmetry assumptions (S 2 ) and (S 3 ) imply that g i #g 1 and # 1 ## 1 for all i # I. Hence, hereafter we drop the subindex from these two functions.
Consider now the seller's problem of finding the standard mechanism that maximizes expected revenue. By explicitly carrying out the integration with respect to s i &i for each i, the seller's problem can be stated as
, and monotonicity and integrability constraints.
We now identify a class of problems for which it is possible to relax both the monotonicity and integrability constraints. If the problem is``regular'', then the solution of the relaxed problem satisfies these constraints automatically.
The second-price auction. Let [b Ä *, b *] N be the set of admissible bids. If player i does not participate or submits an invalid bid, we make his bid b i = V . Let J denote the set of all bidders who submit a valid bid, W be the subset of those who submit the largest (valid) bid, and *(J) and *(W) be their corresponding cardinalities. Pick any i # W, and let
Then, for each i # I, buyer i's payment and probability of getting the object are given by
Observe that we have extended the domain of the functions p i and x i to R N , where R :
, and thus the auction specifies an outcome for any subset of buyers who submit a valid bid. Obviously, the secondprice auction is anonymous.
Proposition 4. B* is the unique symmetric equilibrium of the secondprice auctions.
Proof. The proof follows the standard argument that shows that in the case without externalities, bidding one own's valuation is a dominant strategy. By symmetry, it is enough to show that for any t 1 , B 1 *(t 1 ) is a best response for player 1 to B* &1 . Let t 1 # T 1 and b 1 :=B*(t 1 ). Consider another bid b$ 1 <b 1 . Let h denote the highest bid submitted by 1's opponents. If h<b$ 1 <b 1 , then player 1 gets the object whether he bids b 1 or b$ 1 , and pays h in both cases. Thus, in both cases his payoff is t Associated with the second-price auction (x s , p s ), there is an equivalent direct revelation mechanism (\^s, x^s, p^s), defined as follows. For each t # T, N ) is the corresponding profile of probability vectors defined in Proposition 3. Actually, the direct revelation mechanism ( \^s, x^s, p^s) differs from the second-price auction (x s , p s ) in that it makes a different threat for the case in which a buyer does not participate. In (x s , p s ) the auction is run with as many buyers who decide to participate. Instead, in ( \^s, x^s, p^s), the object is allocated according with the lottery \ si when buyer i does not participate. By Proposition 3, the seller's expected revenue can also be improved in (\^s, x^s, p^s) with an appropriate translation of the payments. Although in Proposition 3 we achieved this by increasing the payment of every type of every buyer, now we prefer to present this translation in terms of an entry fee. The entry fee is determined so as to extract the most surplus from the buyers while still ensuring that all types participate in the auction.
To avoid case (iii) in Proposition 3, which involves an endogenous computation, the rest of the section assumes that either case (i) or case (ii) holds.
The second-price auction with entry fee. Each player must pay an entry fee E=max[0, e 0 ] to participate. If all buyers participate and submit a valid bid, the payments and probability assignment vector are given by (x s , p s ). If buyer i does not participate or does not make a valid bid, the object is allocated according with the lottery \^s i , where
The second-price auction with entry fee is a standard anonymous mechanism that always transfers the object (in equilibrium).
Proposition 5. Suppose problem (P) is regular and that either (i) e 1 0, or (ii) e 0 0. Then the optimal standard anonymous mechanism that always transfers the object is the second-price auction with entry fee. In its corresponding (best) equilibrium, all buyers participate ( pay the entry fee), and bid according with the strategy B*.
Proof. If we require that
, and drop the monotonicity and integrability constraints of problem (P), the relaxed problem can be solved by pointwise maximization. The solution of the latter is
That is, the object is assigned (with probability 1) to the player i with the largest value of #(b i ). Since the problem is regular, this is the player with the largest bid b i . Hence, the pointwise maximization yields the solution p#p s . By Proposition 4, the mechanism (x s , p s ) has the unique symmetric equilibrium B*. Hence, the direct revelation mechanism (\^s, (E, ..., E)+x^s, p^s) is feasible, and therefore, by Proposition 1, p^s is monotone and conservative.
The reader can check that E+x s i implies the same optimal expected payment y^i (C i ) defined in Proposition 3 for the cases (i) and (ii). Hence, (\^s, (E, ..., E)+x^s, p^s) is the optimal direct revelation mechanism for the given p^s.
Remark. As we argue below, when N=2 and the seller always transfers the object, the restriction to standard mechanisms is not binding. Consider an incentive compatible auction mechanism ( \, y, p) that always transfers the object ( p(t) # 7 0 for all t # T ). If S i denotes buyer i 's surplus function, by Proposition 1 we have that {S i (t i )=q i (t i ) a.e. t i # T i , and therefore
where to avoid confusion below, we are denoting the partial derivative of S i with respect to its j th argument at t i by D j S i (t i ). ). This implies that
and that q
. By incentive compatibility, we must also have that y 1 (s 1 )= y 1 (t 1 ). Define the standard auction mechanism (\, y^, p^) as follows: for each (
The argument above shows that B* is an equilibrium of ( \, y^, p^). Thus, when N=2 and the seller always transfers the object, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to standard bidding mechanisms. Therefore, when N=2, by Proposition 5, the second-price auction (with appropriate entry fees) is optimal among all auctions that always transfer the object (standard or otherwise). The same conclusion holds for N 3, when the type spaces are twodimensional in the following way.
A similar argument to that above shows that in this case too the secondprice auction (with appropriate entry fees) is optimal among all auctions that always transfer the object.
SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS WITH RESERVE PRICES
We now relax the constraint of the previous section, that the auction always transfers the object (in equilibrium), and investigate whether it is beneficial for the seller to keep the object sometimes. More specifically, we now consider a second-price auction with reserve price x 0 : if each buyer's bid is below the reserve price x 0 , the object remains with the seller; otherwise, the highest bidder gets the object and pays a price equal to the largest of the second highest bid and the reservation price x 0 . The one-dimensional case suggests that reserve prices may enhance the seller's revenue, and we are interested in determining the optimal reserve price x 0 .
Equilibrium. We construct a symmetric equilibrium B=(B 1 , ..., B N ) with the following characteristics. There is a convex region M 0 such that
12
As we argue more precisely below (for the case N=2, although the analysis easily extends to the case N>2 as well), bidding B 1 *(t 1 ) for types t 1 Â M 0 is optimal for very much the same reasons of Proposition 4. In order for B to constitute an equilibrium, the induced conditional probability assignment function q 1 must be conservative in T 1 . Clearly, q 1 is conservative in M 0 and T 1 "M 0 , respectively. However, q 1 (t 1 ) is discontinuous as t 1 crosses the boundary between M 0 and T 1 "M 0 . Therefore, by Proposition 2, the vector field q 1 is conservative iff the jump in q 1 (t 1 ) is perpendicular to the boundary of M 0 as t 1 crosses that boundary. It turns out that this condition together with a boundary condition (see below) fully characterizes the region M 0 . Thus, there is a unique candidate equilibrium B. In an example, we explicitly construct that B, and verify that it is an equilibrium. For this model, Proposition 2 proves to be a very powerful characterization result.
Formally, suppose the boundary of M 0 can be parametrized by a function h:
Then, t 1 # T 1 is in the boundary of M 0 iff t Hence, by Proposition 2, the jump 2q 1 (t 1 ) must be parallel to n for all
for each j>1.
AUCTIONS WITH EXTERNALITIES
12 Alternatively, we could have introduced entry fees instead of (or in addition to) reserve prices. However, one can view an entry fee as an equivalent reserve price, and vice-versa. For example, in the equilibrium just described, we could replace the reservation price x 0 by an entry fee e=m N&1 0
x 0 , where m 0 is the probability that t 1 # M 0 . Then, the symmetric equilibrium B for the auction with reserve price corresponds to the following``equivalent'' symmetric equilibrium for the auction with entry fees. Types t 1 # M 0 do not participate, and types t 1 Â M 0 pay the entry fee and bid B 1 *(t 1 ), as before. The reader can check that in this equilibrium, the winner and each player's total expected payment is the same as in the equilibrium B of the auction with reserver price. A type t 1 Â M 0 , for example, now pays the entry fee e for sure. But, he also pays nothing when all his opponents' types are in (their corresponding) region M 0 , while with reserve prices, he would pay x 0 . Ex-ante, the expected value of the this payment in the auction with reserve price is exactly e.
FIGURE 1
This is a system of first-order partial differential equations, whose solution yields the equilibrium for the second price auction with reserve price x 0 .
We now illustrate the above technique for the case N=2, where
, and f 2 (t 1 , t 2 )= f 1 (t 2 , t 1 ) for all (t 1 , t 2 ) # T 2 . This is a negative externalities case, and thus we just need to consider nonnegative reserve prices x 0 . Since by symmetry we only study buyer 1's strategy, the superindex for types will be omitted. Observe that the type t=(x 0 , 0), who suffers no externality, must be on the boundary of M 0 because he is indifferent between getting the object at price x 0 and not getting the object (and paying nothing). When x 0 is relatively small, the region M 0 is contained between the line segments [0, Fig. 1 . 13 The observation above implies that h(0)=x 0 . We will show that when x 0 is not too large, the solution of the differential equation satisfies 0<h$(t 2 )<1 for all t 2 # [&:, 0]. (Note that this implies that :>x 0 .)
and
where
denotes the measure of A/R 2 according with the probability density f 1 . Also define m 0 :=Prob(M 0 ), and m(t 2 ) :=m 1 (h(t 2 ), t 2 ) for each t 2 # [&:, 0].
If the players bid according to B, then each player's conditional probability assignment vector is piecewise continuous. Player 1's conditional probability assignment vector q 1 (t) is equal to
for t # M 0 and t # T 1 "M 0 , respectively. Using the test proposed in footnote 4, for example, it is easy to check that q 1 (t) is conservative in each region M 0 and T 1 "M 0 . Moreover, q 1 (t) has a discontinuity at the boundary between regions M 0 and M 1 . Consider a type t=(t 1 , t 2 ) in the boundary between M 0 and T 1 "M 0 . That is, such that t 1 =h(t 2 ). Let q 1 (t + ) be the conditional probability assignment vector given that bidder 1 bids t 1 &t 2 (and bidder 2 uses strategy B 2 ). Similarly, let q 1 (t & ) be the conditional probability assignment vector if bidder 1 bids 0 instead. Then
The vector ( 1 &h$(t 2 ) ) is normal to the boundary of M 0 at t, and the condition that it is parallel to 2q 1 (t) (Proposition 2) becomes in this case
Since m 0 >0 and m(t 2 ) 0, Eq. (1) 
Lemma 3. Assume buyer 2 plays according to strategy B 2 . Then, buyer 1 with type t # T 1 is indifferent between bidding B 1 *(t) and 0 iff t satisfies Eq. (1) and h(0)=x 0 .
The proof of Lemma 3 is in the Appendix.
Proposition 6. Assume that (h, m 0 ) solves the pair of Eqs. (1) and (2), with the initial condition h(0)=x 0 . Then B (as defined above) is an equilibrium of the second price auction with reserve price x 0 .
Proof. Suppose t # T 1 "M 0 , and let b 1 =B 1 *(t). The argument that b 1 is a better response to B 2 than any b$ 1 {b 1 with b$ 1 # [x 0 , 2] is exactly the same as in Proposition 4. On the other hand, Lemma 3 above establishes that Eq. (1) exactly characterizes the set of types t # T 1 who are indifferent between bidding 0 and B 1 *(t) given that buyer 2 uses the strategy B 2 . Let t # T 1 with t 2 > &: and t 1 >h(t 2 ) (that is, t 1 # T 1 "M 0 ), and consider the type t$ :=(h(t 2 ), t 2 ), which is on the boundary of M 0 . Then, when both types t and t$ bid h(t 2 )&t 2 , type t expects strictly more than type t$. Also, t$ expects the same payoff when he bids h(t 2 )&t 2 or 0. Finally, since t$ 2 =t 2 , when types t and t$ bid 0, they both expect the same payoff. These inequalities imply that type t strictly prefers bidding B 1 *(t) to bidding 0. Similar arguments show that type t # T 1 with t 2 &: strictly prefers bidding B 1 *(t) to bidding 0 (in this case, consider the type t$=(0, &:) for the argument), and that a type t # M 0 strictly prefers the bid 0 to any bid above x 0 . K Example. Let v 1 =1, e 0 =&1, and f 1 #1 in [0, 1]_[&1, 0] (that is, f 1 is the density of a uniform distribution). In this case, there is a unique solution of Eqs. (1) and (2), which is given by Optimality and exclusion. We now wish to use the example above to provide some insights for the optimality of reserve prices in our multidimensional setting with externalities. In a symmetric model without externalities, Myerson has shown that the optimal auction is a second-price auction with a reserve price. The seller may announce a reserve price that is higher than her true reservation value, in which case the seller excludes some types of buyers from consumption. Exclusion in Myerson's one-dimensional setting has two effects that go in opposite directions. By excluding some types: (1) the seller restricts supply, and is able to collect higher prices; (2) the seller foregoes potentially profitable trades. In standard one-dimensional problems, the relative strength of those effects is determined by the relation between the seller's and buyers' valuations.
For his model of a multiproduct monopolist, Armstrong proves that the first effect is always dominant. The intuition is as follows. Consider the constrained optimal pricing policy in which all consumers must be served. Naturally, with this policy there are consumers with``low'' valuations who are just indifferent between buying a bundle and nonparticipation. The seller can then raise its total revenues by increasing uniformly the price of every bundle it offers by a small amount =>0. With the new pricing policy, all the consumers who still participate, buy the same bundle as before, but pay = more. The new pricing policy excludes those consumers who before were obtaining a surplus less than =. However they represent a fraction of the total mass of consumers of order o(=).
14 Thus, exclusion of a fraction of consumers is always optimal, even if the consumers' valuations are much higher than the production costs.
In our model, however, there is a third effect due to competition: when the seller excludes some types, buyers are less afraid that the good might go to another buyer. Consequently, nonparticipation becomes more attractive, and the seller must decrease the revenue it extracts from each type of every participating buyer. The proof of Lemma 4 is in the Appendix; here we provide some intuition. Consider the effects of increasing the reserve price from 0 to x 0 ==, for a small =>0: (a) the seller now keeps the object when both bidders' types are in M 0 ; (b) the seller now gets = instead of min [B 1 *(t 1 ), B 2 *(t 2 )] when one bidder's type is in M 0 and the other bidder's type is outside M 0 . As in Armstrong's paper, the first effect is of smaller order than the second (the orders are = 4 and = 3 respectively see the proof of Lemma 4). Hence, the valuation of the seller plays no role in determining whether a small amount of exclusion is desirable. However, in contrast to the setting where a multiproduct monopolist faces a measure of non-interacting buyers, the sign of the second effect is ambiguous. This is due to the additional competition effect among buyers. The sign of this term depends on whether the average bid B i *(t i ) of types in M 0 (who are excluded when the reserve price = is imposed) is below or above =.
15 In our example, it turns out that this average bid is above =, and hence exclusion is suboptimal. Compared to Myerson's result for the standard case, this result by itself is not surprising: if the seller cost is sufficiently lower than the minimum buyer's valuation, in his model too the optimal reserve price is 0. However, contrary to his case, here the optimal reserve price is not a continuous function of the difference t Consider now the class of standard bidding mechanisms 16 satisfying the following property. For each player i, there exists a set X i /T i such that
Observe that this class of mechanisms covers the type of exclusion achieved by instruments such as reserve prices and entry fee. 17 For this class, it can be shown that the second-price auction with a (possibly zero) reserve price is the revenue maximizing mechanism. Thus, in this class, exclusion is not always optimal. The argument relies on the following observations: (1) in the region where the object is transferred with probability 1, the object must be allocated to the player with the highest summary type B i * (t i ); (2) the monotonicity and integrability conditions imply that for any player i, the set X i coincides with the set M 0 for some reserve price x 0 .
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2. Since the set of piecewise constant functions is dense in the set of piecewise continuous functions (with the sup norm), it is enough to prove the result for piecewise constant functions. Suppose then that q i is piecewise constant: 
Since this is true for every path 1 in the common boundary between M j and M m , we must have that for every 
Thus, it suffices to show that
For the proof of case (i), when e 1 <0, choose for example
Recall that in this case ;=e 1 and
In case (ii), when e 0 >0, ;=0, and 
The last inequality is satisfied because t To simplify the notation, we prove this equality for the case i=2 and j=3. The solution of (4) 
The relevant solution of (7) (where k(t 2 )=h(t 2 )&t 2 and h is the function that parametrizes the boundary of M 0 ). For any x # [x 0 , :], the set of types for player 1 that bid less than or equal to x is M 0 _ M(t 2 ), where t 2 is such that x=h(t 2 )&t 2 =k(t 2 ). Therefore Let f X and f B denote respectively the Radon Nikodym derivative of the absolutely continuous parts of F X and F B . Since In the previous to the last line we have used the change of variables t=l(x), and the fact that h(&:)=0 implies that k(&:)=: and h(0)=x 0 implies k(0)=x 0 . Albeit complex, the last integral can be computed explicitly in closed form, and we can express the expected revenue as a function of the reserve price as follows: Since the seller keeps the object when both buyers' types are in M 0 , and this happens with probability m 
